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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No: 2:17-cv-05323-KSH-CLW)
District Judge: Honorable Katherine S. Hayden
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on November 16, 2018
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.








BIBAS, Circuit Judge. 
Breaking contracts has consequences. Michael Volrath signed a contract with his for-
mer employer that contained confidentiality and non-solicitation clauses. He has repeatedly 
breached those clauses. 
The District Court enjoined further breaches. It found that his former employer will 
likely succeed on the merits and would otherwise suffer irreparable harm. Given Volrath’s 
repeated breaches, the Court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. And the Court applied 
the correct post-employment conditions and legal standards. So it did not abuse its discre-
tion. We will affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Heartland Payment Systems provides credit- and debit-card payment equipment and 
services. Heartland makes money by enrolling merchants and charging a fee for each pay-
ment it processes for them. And its employees take home a share of its profits in commis-
sions even after they leave Heartland. 
Volrath worked at Heartland for ten years. He solicited merchants and learned much 
confidential information. During his job, he signed two types of agreements restricting 
what he could do after leaving his job. When he left Heartland, he breached some of those 
post-employment conditions. 
A. Manager agreement 
As he rose through the ranks, Volrath signed a manager agreement that laid out various 
conditions of his job. It also restricted what he could do after he left Heartland. Two post-
employment conditions are at issue. 
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First, the manager agreement has a confidentiality clause. When Volrath left the 
company, he had to return Heartland’s confidential information or destroy it. And he could 
not use or disclose it to anyone. 
Second, the agreement has a non-solicitation clause. When Volrath left, he could not 
poach Heartland’s merchants or employees. The clause broadly governs all of Heartland’s 
merchants: it forbids soliciting “any [Heartland] Merchant or other party having a 
contractual or business relationship with [Heartland]” for one year. App. 32 ¶ 9(a). The 
clause also has a narrower five-year ban on soliciting those merchants that Volrath signed. 
The non-solicitation clause bans soliciting or recruiting Heartland’s employees for two 
years as well. 
B. Commission agreements 
While working at Heartland, Volrath also signed at least twenty-two commission agree-
ments—all of which he signed after the manager agreement. These agreements let employ-
ees sell their rights to future commission payments in exchange for a lump-sum payment. 
Each commission agreement also contains a non-solicitation clause equal in scope to 
the narrow ban in the manager agreement: for several years, Volrath may not solicit Heart-
land’s merchants that he signed. True, the clause did change once over the years, and the 
earlier version applied to “any merchant having a Merchant Agreement with [Heartland].” 
App. 99 ¶ 4. And this clause could be read more broadly to bar soliciting any of Heartland’s 
merchants. But Volrath concedes that the merchants at issue in the earlier version are only 
those that he signed. Appellant’s Br. 8 & n.2. And the language he quotes that purportedly 
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broadens this reach is found only in the manager agreement, not the commission agree-
ments. The old and new versions of the commission agreement are thus identical in scope. 
So the commission agreements are narrower than the manager agreement. They do not 
ban soliciting all Heartland merchants. Nor do they ban soliciting Heartland employees. 
And unlike the manager agreement’s strict limits on using all confidential information, the 
commission agreements’ confidentiality clause reaches only the terms of the agreements. 
Both the commission agreements and management agreement also contain a boilerplate 
merger clause. That clause provides that each agreement “comprises the entire agreement 
between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior 
and contemporaneous agreements and understandings.” App. 100 ¶ 7 (emphasis added); 
accord App. 34. 
C. Contractual violations 
After ten years, Volrath left Heartland to work for a direct competitor, performing the 
same duties. He immediately began violating the manager agreement’s post-employment 
conditions. 
As Volrath admitted, he breached the confidentiality clause. Just hours after resigning, 
he emailed confidential information to the competitor’s employees, some of whom were 
his own children. He also testified that he had a list of Heartland’s prospective merchants 
sent to his personal email account. And he solicited merchants on that list for the compet-
itor. He admits that these emails contained confidential information. Yet he accessed the 
information ten to fifteen times after resigning. 
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He also solicited Heartland’s merchants. He persuaded a restaurant owner to switch 
from Heartland to the competitor. And he contacted two other executives to steer their 
business away from Heartland to his new employer. All three merchants had contractual or 
business relationships with Heartland. 
And Volrath allegedly tried to poach a Heartland employee. The employee testified that 
Volrath described the competitor’s compensation plan and tried to recruit him. For all these 
breaches, Heartland sued.  
The District Court granted Heartland a preliminary injunction. Volrath now challenges 
that order. The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). NutraSweet Co. v. Vit-Mar Enters., Inc., 176 
F.3d 151, 153 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Three standards govern our review of preliminary injunctions. We review legal conclu-
sions de novo; findings of fact for clear error; and the ultimate decision to grant or deny 
relief for abuse of discretion. K.A. ex rel. Ayers v. Pocono Mountain Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 
99, 105 (3d Cir. 2013). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY GRANTED THE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 
To get a preliminary injunction, Heartland had to show (1) a likelihood of success on 
the merits; (2) a greater-than-even chance of irreparable harm without a preliminary in-
junction; (3) a favorable balance of equities; and (4) the public interest favoring the injunc-
tion. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 2017). Only the first two 
prongs are in dispute. Because the District Court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, we 
find no abuse of discretion. 
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A. Heartland showed a likelihood of success on the merits 
Volrath argues that the District Court erred by applying the non-solicitation clause from 
the manager agreement rather than the one from the latest commission agreement. And 
because he did not violate this commission agreement, he argues, the Court erred in finding 
that Heartland was likely to succeed on the merits. But the manager agreement governs, 
and he breached that agreement’s non-solicitation clause as well as its confidentiality 
clause.  
While Volrath does not dispute that the manager agreement’s confidentiality clause 
governs, he does argue that its non-soliciation clause does not. He contends that, because 
of the merger clause, the non-solicitation clause in the commission agreement trumps the 
one in the manager agreement. 
The District Court disagreed. It found that “the subject matter[s]” of the two agreements 
were so different that the commission agreement’s non-solicitation clause only 
supplemented that of the manager agreement rather than supplanting it. Heartland Payment 
Sys., LLC v. Volrath, No. 2:17-5323-KSH-CLW, 2017 WL 6803519, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 
31, 2017). The Court read the commission agreement narrowly to cover a single subject 
matter: “the purchase of partial commissions related to merchant accounts.” Id. at *5. That 
reading, however, is too limited. The “subject matter” in the merger clause refers to all 
terms in the very contract that the clause integrates. 
But the management agreement still controls. The manager agreement’s non-solicita-
tion clause broadly governs three different subjects: (1) all Heartland’s merchants; 
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(2) Heartland’s merchants that Volrath signed; and (3) Heartland’s employees. The com-
mission agreement does not reach the first or third subjects; it forbids soliciting only Heart-
land merchants that compensated Volrath. Because there is no overlapping subject-matter 
of soliciting all Heartland’s merchants and employees, the manager agreement continues 
to govern those two subjects. And the Court correctly found “ample evidence” that Volrath 
breached those two terms. Id. at *7.  
Volrath does not dispute any of the other requirements for showing a likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits. So the District Court correctly found for Heartland on this point. 
B. Heartland showed that it was likely to suffer irreparable harm 
Volrath next argues that the District Court applied the wrong legal standard to find a 
likelihood of irreparable harm. He also argues that this finding was clearly erroneous. We 
disagree on both counts. 
1. The District Court applied the right legal standard. Volrath argues that the District 
Court applied the wrong legal standard by requiring Heartland to show only an “immi-
nent possibility” of irreparable harm. Appellant’s Br. 23. The correct standard requires 
the moving party to show that it would “more likely than not . . . suffer irreparable harm in 
the absence of preliminary relief.” Reilly, 858 F.3d at 179. 
But the District Court used the right standard in its opinion: “Heartland must establish 
. . . ‘that [it] is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief.’ ” Heart-
land Payment Sys., 2017 WL 6803519, at *5 (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)) (emphasis added). The opinion never mentioned an “imminent 
possibility.” The Court used that phrase several times at oral argument, but it never held 
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that was the standard. And we should not give every stray inquiry at oral argument the 
same weight as a written opinion. See Dellew Corp. v. United States, 855 F.3d 1375, 1381 
(Fed. Cir. 2017). So the Court applied the right standard. 
2. The District Court did not err in finding a likelihood of irreparable harm. Finally, 
Volrath argues that the District Court clearly erred in finding that Heartland would likely 
suffer irreparable harm. It did not err. 
The Court again analyzed pertinent caselaw and relied on the record to grant the in-
junction. Rightly so: the risk of irreparable harm here was far from speculative. Volrath 
had already breached the confidentiality and non-solicitation clauses many times. Those 
breaches were immediate and serious, so the Court correctly applied “a strong presump-
tion that he will breach again.” Heartland Payment Sys., 2017 WL 6803519, at *8. And 
ample evidence showed that continued breaches could cause irreparable, incalculable 
harm to Heartland, including loss of goodwill and damage to its reputation. 
So the Court held that “[t]he evidence Heartland adduced establishes that the ‘concrete 
risk’ and ‘changed loyalties’ about which Third Circuit cases have cautioned are in play.” 
Id. That was not error, let alone clear error.  
* * * * * 
The manager agreement’s confidentiality and non-solicitation clauses govern, and 
Volrath breached them. And the District Court thoroughly considered all the relevant cases 
and facts in the record in finding that a preliminary injunction is warranted. It neither 
clearly erred nor abused its discretion. So we will affirm. 
